It was Philadelphia's fault
Last May 25th, I was waiting for the inbound R5 local train at Merion Station when I pieced together that something was amiss. The outbound R5, which generally arrives a few minutes before the inbound, was motionless on the tracks, just short of the station platform. A service announcement informed the crowd of passengers that trains are running approximately fifteen minutes behind schedule. No problem, I remember thinking to myself, that still counts as "on time" by most SEPTA riders' standards. However, after twenty minutes of waiting, the announcements were now simply saying that trains were delayed, with an implied duration of "indefinitely."
It turns out that there was a system-wide blackout on the NorthEast Corridor, immobilizing Amtrak trains from Washington to New York, as well as trains running on any of the former Pennsylvania Railroad suburban lines on the same grid--in Philadelphia, this means the R1 Airport, R2 Newark, R3 Media, R5 Paoli, R6 Cynwyd, R7 Trenton, and R8 Chestnut Hill lines. While it quickly became clear that a domino effect of power failures had crippled the system, whose last-generation power infrastructure dates back as many as 80 years, the specific cause was unknown... until now. Naturally, it was all Philadelphia's fault.
To be precise, a very up-do-date computer (that happened to be in Philadelphia) missed a routine command and was apparently not programmed to let anybody know. However, let's not tack all the blame onto the oft-maligned home of the Billy Penn Curse--after all, once the power did fail across the entire system, Amtrak was not in any position to deal with it anywhere: being accustomed to fixing isolated problems at their leisure, their technicians had to be deployed from a distance rather than being on-site already, and then there's the issue of rescue engines not being able to function because Amtrak and New Jersey Transit personnel, for example, didn't know how to operate each other's controls (whether or not they were stuck inside the Hudson River tunnels at the time). Since then, or so the article would have us believe, many of these organizational errors have been addressed. Certainly, it's common courtesy to show that they have learned from their mistakes, but I think there's a somewhat more obscure meaning to these new measures: if the newest equipment can screw up this big, it's bound to happen again.

